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The Truth of Love and the Love of
Truth: A Christian Plato-Scholar Stops
to Look at What He’s Doing, and Why

by Aron Reppmann

Plato is unusual among the writers normally recognized as major contributors to the western philosophical tradition. What’s so unusual about him is
that he never tells us what he thinks; or at least he
doesn’t tell us in the direct, propositional way we
tend to associate with thinkers who want to be sure
that they get their point across. Plato wrote a loosely connected set of dramas, which we traditionally
call “dialogues,” although they frequently involve
multiple characters and include elements that are
not strictly covered by the term “dialogue,” such as
considerable amounts of dramatic action. Plato never
Aron Reppmann is Assistant Professor of Phlosophy and
Director of the Honors Program at Trinity Christian
College, Palos Heights, Illinois.

appears as a speaking character in these dramas,
and, unlike some philosophers who also wrote dialogues, he left us no companion text in which he
says, speaking for himself, what the fictional texts
are attempting to portray. Plato does not say anything, in the conventional sense, but he shows many
things in indirect, suggestive, and exploratory ways.
Interpreting Plato requires discerning the coherence
among various elements that might seem, at first
glance, to be unrelated: for example, between one
topic that is discussed and another; or between what
the characters in a particular dialogue say and what
they do or enact; or between what is said and done
in one of the dialogues and what is said and done in
another dialogue that shares some of the same
themes, concerns, or characters but portrays them in
a different light.
My current project is to explore a web of such
interconnected elements regarding two kinds of
interpersonal relationship or attachment as they are
discussed and depicted in three of Plato’s dialogues
in which they play a central role. Those dialogues
are entitled Lysis, Phaedrus, and Symposium, and the
two kinds of interpersonal relationship or attachment
I’m talking about are erōs and philia. Erōs is often
translated as “love” or “passionate desire”; in everyday use, it means just what we mean when we talk
about “eroticism.” Philia, on the other hand, is often
translated as “friendship” or “friendly feeling.”
Now, if it sounds as though I’m being especially
careful to qualify these translations (with phrases
like “is often translated as”), you’re already beginning to perceive what my work on Plato is about.
For Plato’s contemporaries, just as for our own, there
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were assumed to be clear differences, boundaries of
separation, between erōs and philia; to put the matter roughly, we could say that we would expect erōs
and philia to be distinct “topics.” However, my project is to demonstrate that in the three dialogues of
Plato in which erōs or philia constitutes the major
focal point of the discussion, matters seem to be
deliberately more complicated: in both the concepts
discussed and the action depicted, the possible relationships between erōs and philia are constantly
explored in ways that seem to make the meanings of
both continually shift in relation to one another. To
complicate matters even further, Plato’s depiction of
the dynamics of erōs and philia seems to have an
effect much larger and more profound than we might
expect. Although the discussions and enactments of
erōs and philia in these dialogues certainly have
something to do with the ethics of interpersonal
relations, there is also a lot of exploration about
the deeper significance of these forms of devotion or
attachment. We often think of ethics as a “secondary”
subdiscipline of philosophy: on that conventional
model, it is the “primary” considerations of metaphysics or ontology, the grand, abstract theories of
the structure of everything, that lay the groundwork,
and what’s left for ethics is just practical application
of metaphysical principles. Plato’s representation of
the dynamics of erōs and philia, I’m happy to say,
turns that conventional model upside down. At key
points in these dialogues, Plato seems to be experimenting, at once seriously and playfully, with the
possibility that, if people could just understand what
erōs and philia are really about—their ultimate significance—and would conduct themselves in ways
that are attuned to that ultimate significance, they
would achieve the highest and most comprehensive
understanding possible for humans, and they would
lead the most fully achieved life possible for
humans. To put it another way, getting rightly oriented with regard to one’s understanding and practice of erōs and philia is portrayed as philosophy
itself, not “philosophy” as the peculiar academic discipline that we are familiar with, but “philosophy” as
philosophia, the love of wisdom, an all-encompassing and harmonious way of life.
That’s a quick survey of the area I’m working in,
with a good deal left out and much unargued for. In
fact, almost none of what I have said so far about
Plato is uncontroversial. What I’d like to do is
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simply to unfold some of those controversies
expressing my work as a scholar. I’ll begin by
talking about Christian identity and scholarly
practice, and then offer two specific examples of
controversies in which my approach as a Christian
scholar helps me to contribute to the larger scholarly
discussion on Plato.
Christian identity and scholarly practice:
who am I in my scholarship, and what
difference does it make?
I need to begin this section of my remarks with
an important disclaimer: as a Christian scholar, I
have worked more in an exploratory way—discovering both the field and myself, including aspects of
my identity as a Christian, along the way—than in
a programmatic, deductive way. I did not first get
my Christian scholarly perspective fully in order,
and then apply it as a preformulated pattern for
encountering the history of philosophy; rather, as a
person with my intellectual habits somewhat
formed, but not perfected or finalized, by the traditions and practices of the Christian communities in
which I have spent my entire life (including an
undergraduate education at Trinity), I set out to
discover what attracted me and what made me
suspicious, and to find out whether careful
research, as well as living with the consequences of
the ideas I embraced, would prove my attractions
and suspicions to have been trustworthy or not. This
experiment with myself is not finished, but our discussion today is a chance for me to stop for a
breather along the way and to look back. Please
keep in mind, then, that when I reflect on the coherence between my identity as a Christian and my
practice as a scholar, you are hearing a report on
retrospection, on hindsight. I hope that my hindsight is clear and accurate, but it will also necessarily be reflective and interpretive. I do not offer you
absolute principles of Christian scholarship with
which I consciously began and which I kept firmly
in front of me all along; if you can trace your own
scholarly path that way, then God has blessed you
differently from me. Instead, I offer you some of
the patterns I can see now that I look back on the
steps I’ve taken, patterns that have more to do with
communally formed habits than they do with my
own reasoning and choosing. Let me point out two
such patterns.

(1) Awareness of limits and of the necessity of
assumptions. The communities in which I was
formed as a Christian, indeed as a person, emphasized and blessed the finitude of human life, its limits. It’s important that I say that our finite character
was not just emphasized but also blessed: I was
taught early and in many ways (most of them
not focused in intellectual statements) that being a
limited human creature was not the same thing as
being a sinful, broken human creature—I was and
am both, but my damnable brokenness cries out for
healing, whereas my limitation just means that I’m a
creature, not the creator. This attitude has a particular intellectual corollary, which is especially prized
by the Reformed and Catholic intellectual traditions
that have nourished me: I know that I have deep,
basic orientations and assumptions on which all of
my thinking and living are based but which I cannot
fully explain or account for, even to myself. I have
always been deeply puzzled when certain social
reformers insist that people should “pull themselves
up by their own bootstraps”; I always thought that
that image was intended precisely as an example of
what it was impossible for humans to do in any
arena, social or intellectual. Only for a god is it possible to fully close the circle for oneself; there is only
one God, and I am not that God. This awareness,
which as a Trinity student I learned to call “consciousness of presuppositions,” makes me very
attentive to the presuppositions of others, too,
whether or not they know or acknowledge that they
have presuppositions—and especially when their
assumptions seem to clash with my own. Martin
Marty, an eminent church historian, has put the point
this way: Christian scholars can be especially good
at “smoking out presuppositions” because, as criminals say, “it takes one to know one.”
(2) A particular spirituality of reading: the role of
my Christian formation in my approach to ancient
texts. When I talk about a “spirituality of reading,”
I don’t mean a special spiritual something tacked on
to simple reading; I just mean to point out that a spirit, an attitude, an orientation always characterizes
everything we do, including our reading. I was
inducted into this particular spirituality of reading
through churches, homes, and schools in various
clans of the Reformed tribe of the Christian people,
but I do not claim that all the members of that tribe
think and act this way, nor that it is the exclusive

possession of that tribe.
Let me describe the experience of reading that I’m
talking about. When I approach an old text that people whom I trust have assured me is important, I tend
to do so both with eager anticipation that it has
“something for me” and with a cautious awareness
that I will only perceive that “something” well (and
not just see reflections of my own face) if I approach
that text as wholistically as possible, trying to understand its historical context, characterization, narrative voice, dramatic action, rhetorical devices, use of
particular words, associations of words, and so on.
I’m keenly interested in the unsaid dimensions that

When I talk about a
“spirituality of reading,”
I don’t mean a special
spiritual something tacked
on to simple reading;
I just mean to point out
that a spirit, an attitude,
an orientation always
characterizes everything we
do, including our reading.
provide the context, the meaning-framework, for
what is said. Now, I’m not suggesting that a dialogue of Plato is equal to a book of the Bible; there
is certainly a difference. Nevertheless, the particular
activities and objects through which we are initiated
into a practice have a profound effect on our later
exercise of that practice; my 18-month-old son is
becoming more and more familiar with books, and
his mother and I are careful that he has good books
to look at and that he learns to exercise a kind of
delightful respect for them, because these early
encounters with books may profoundly shape his
attitudes about reading for the rest of his life. Well,
my introduction to ancient literature—and indeed,
until I was an adult, pretty much the only ancient
literature I read—was the Bible, and the reverent,
wholistic attention to the said and the unsaid dimensions of that literature that I learned early on
profoundly shape the way I read Plato.
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I’ve discussed two ways in which my particular
identity as a Christian affects my practice as a scholar. Now let me give two examples from my experiences as a scholar among other scholars, experiences
that helped me to become more keenly aware of and
grateful for those elements of my identity that I’ve
just described. Initially, I’ll focus on the first pattern
I indicated, the awareness of human limits and the
necessity of assumptions; I’ll save the second pattern, a particular spirituality of reading, for the final
section, in which I show you how I approach a specific dialogue.
First example: contributing to the scholarly
discussion through attentiveness to
presuppositions
I find that in my scholarly practice, I spend a great
deal of time and energy in “smoking out” the (often
unexamined) presuppositions of other scholars, and
that this work of critique constitutes what I see as
one of the best contributions I can make to Plato
scholarship. I hope it isn’t surprising that the longest
chapter of my dissertation (48 pages and destined to
grow by a few more) is the one devoted to examining the major trends of interpreting Platonic erōs and
philia among modern scholars; for this paper, I ran a
few word searches in this chapter and found out that
words like “assume,” “assumption,” and “presupposition” occur some 96 times. Add to that my introductory chapter, in which I spend some 30 pages laying out and attempting to justify my own assumptions and approaches, and it should be evident that
my faith tradition’s sensitivity to the importance of
human finitude plays a vibrant role in the directions
and strategies of my scholarly work.
I don’t want simply to rest on numbers of pages
and word counts, though; let me give a specific
example of this critical awareness at work. Englishlanguage scholarship on Platonic erōs and philia in
the last century has been dominated by an approach
I call “separatism,” since the distinguishing characteristic of this approach is the tendency to separate
erōs from philia as fundamentally distinct forms of
relating to another person. When these interpreters
turn to investigate erōs and philia in Plato, they treat
them from the outset as distinct issues whose connection, if any, must be established after their own
individual structures have been clearly delineated.
The separatists contend that philia represents the
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mutual, affirming affection that exists between
friends, whereas erōs is represented as an overwhelming desire (originating in or analogous to
sexual desire) in which one seeks only to grasp
something for oneself, not to enter into relationship
with another. I don’t accept that approach; I don’t
find that it’s very helpful for making good sense of
what’s going on in Plato’s dialogues. Because of my
appreciation for the role of presuppositions, though,
I don’t simply take the separatists to task about
the flaws in their particular interpretations of the
dialogues. I also explore the ways in which this
interpretive separation between erōs and philia in
Plato can be understood as resting on deep assumptions concerning what is at stake in erōs and philia,
that is, as answers to such fundamental questions
as these: Why do erōs and philia come up at all as
topics of discussion and investigation in the dialogues?
What is it that is compelling about erōs and philia,
such that they merit (or even demand) philosophical
consideration in Plato’s dialogues?
One example of my critical investigation is in the
way I point out the separatists’ basically individualistic assumptions about human nature and moral categories. One of the most pervasive assumptions in
modern life and thought is that of individualism.
Our conceptions of society and interpersonal relations
are atomistically conceived, in that we tend to consider the human individual as the primary reality and
most basic unit of analysis; approaching a complex
social structure or moral practice, our culture’s
default approach is to resolve it into ever-simpler
units, which we assume will ultimately turn out to be
the actions and attitudes of individual human beings.
Intersubjective relations are understood as having to
overcome a fundamental problem: how can anyone
escape the charge that she is basically a selfish egoist,
since her world is primarily structured by her own
sovereign experience and only secondarily involves
contacts with others, who also have their own
worlds?1
So we have this modern assumption that interpersonal relations consist in successfully building relatively unselfish bridges between basically separate,
self-serving individuals. Many of the separatist interpreters of Plato have allowed this assumption to
work, unchallenged, in their interpretations of the
nature(s) and role(s) of erōs and philia in Plato’s
dialogues. According to this line of interpretation,

philia represents the proper expression of a right
(nonegoistic) form of relationship to others, whereas
erōs is irreparably caught up in egoistic striving that
uses other people only for one’s own selfish purposes.
This approach is very clear in a famous and regrettably influential article by Gregory Vlastos, entitled
“The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato.”
Vlastos begins his examination of whether the
individual can be an object of love for Plato by
setting up an idealized conception of philia to be
used as “a standard against which to measure Plato’s
concept of love.”2 Once this idealized standard of
philia is set up, erōs is defined in opposition to it, so
that Plato’s dialogues, in which erōs undoubtedly
plays an important and often highly honored role in
the conduct of the philosophical life, turn out, in the
estimation of Vlastos, not to “provide for love of
whole persons, but only for love of that abstract
version of persons which consists of the complex of
their best qualities.”3 There are several problems
with Vlastos’ approach, but the deepest and most difficult one is that he begins by posing questions about
Plato that are based on an unexamined acceptance of
our society’s individualistic perspective. For Vlastos,
love is only morally acceptable—is only, in fact,
“real” love—if you love another person’s individual
uniqueness for its own sake rather than appreciating
his or her “qualities” that you may “value,” since
such “valuing” is a sign, for Vlastos, of self-interest.4
In Vlastos’ judgment, erōs is sharply divided from
philia, and Plato’s achievements regarding erōs are
separated from a morally appropriate understanding
of love; but these judgments are made on the basis
of standards that do not really apply to Plato since
those standards are drawn from a distinctly modern
contrast between egoism and altruism.5
The other assumption about human nature and
moral categories that I trace in the separatist interpreters is what I call “sexualism.” Although I will not
take the time to lay out the analysis here, I want to
mention it, since it provides an example of the way
in which my critical scholarly practices, which have
been shaped by my faith community, sometimes
reflect back on that community in ways that are critical of the community’s own unexamined assumptions. What I mean by “sexualism” is the unexamined assumption that the categories of human sexual
experience as we are accustomed to them are fixed
categories, reflecting and defining the character of

human sexual experience as such. When ta erōtika,
“erotic matters,” are assumed to be identified with
the province of what we are accustomed to call
“sexuality,” our understanding of sexual concerns
intrudes on our interpretation of the meaning and
significance of erōs for Plato (and also of philia,
when the latter is defined in terms of its difference
from erōs). When applied to the moral dimension,
sexualism results in the assumption that our concerns
are more or less those of people in all times and
places. Therefore, I’m impatient with commentators
who assert, as a key to interpreting Plato, that Plato
was a “homosexual” or an “invert,” or, conversely,

What I mean by “sexualism”
is the unexamined assumption
that the categories of human
sexual experience as we are
accustomed to them are fixed
categories, reflecting and
defining the character of human
sexual experience as such.
that he was “anti-homosexual.” As long as they
assume that these terms mean the same things in
talking about Plato as they would in talking about
someone in our time, they have an unexamined “sexualistic” assumption at work. I make this argument
not only in the footnotes of what I write but also
when I’m talking with students, Trinity colleagues,
trustees of the college, and other interested parties
who are puzzled by my fascination with an author
who writes a lot about paiderastia, “pederasty,”
without clearly and unambiguously condemning
what we call “pedophilia.”
Second example: contributing to the
scholarly discussion through a wholistic
spirituality of reading
Plato’s dialogue Lysis pays a lot of attention to
philia. Most of the discussions in the dialogue are
focused on questions concerning this relationship,6
and at the close of the dialogue, Plato underscores
the importance of these discussions of philia by
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having Socrates express frustration and shame to
his conversation partners, because although “we
suppose we’re one another’s friends,” “what he who
is a friend is we have not yet been able to discover”
(223b).7 The attention paid to philia within the
dialogue has led many commentators, from ancient
scholars down to our own contemporaries, to declare
that philia is the “topic” of the dialogue. 8
However, in their concern to understand Plato’s
treatment of philia in the Lysis, most commentators
have failed to notice the presence and importance
in this dialogue of another form of interpersonal
relationship: erōs. The dialogue begins with a
discussion among Socrates and two young men,
Ctesippus and Hippothales, on the question of how
one should conduct oneself toward his beloved, the
one for whom he has erōs. Ctesippus tells Socrates
that Hippothales has been annoying all their companions by the ways in which he’s trying to gain the
favor of his beloved, who is named Lysis. Socrates
agrees that Hippothales has been going about it
all wrong, and he agrees to demonstrate for
Hippothales how one should conduct oneself
toward one’s favorite. This promised “demonstration” is the pretext for the entire remainder of the
dialogue, in which Socrates engages young Lysis
and his friend Menexenus in a series of discussions
about philia—discussions which are actually about
far more than “friendship” narrowly conceived,
since Socrates uses an examination of the boys’
assumptions about friendship as a starting-point for
uncovering and criticizing their assumptions about
what the world is like as a whole and how they
should live their lives in it. Besides that, the topic of
erōs keeps bleeding into the discussion (211e,
212b-c, 221b, e, and following). With all of this in
mind, you can imagine the ways in which the dialogue as a whole suffers at the hands of the general
scholarly tendency to declare that the Lysis is
simply about philia; for one thing, they have to
ignore or explain away the erotic dimensions of the
story. 9,10,11,12 The Lysis has often been considered
uninteresting, ill-formed, a source of some intriguing puzzles about friendship but not very worthy in
its own right—and besides, there are those strange,
distracting references to erōs that keep intruding
into the discussion. One eminent scholar summarized his estimation of this dialogue by writing:
“Even Plato can nod.”
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My own examination of this dialogue, rather than
trying to explain away these seeming anomalies,
approaches the dialogue wholistically and with a
kind of reverent attention. I show that erōs, far from
being irrelevant or only of peripheral concern, plays
a fundamentally important role throughout the
course of the dialogue, even in those passages that
seem to be focused only on philia. Erōs provides the
framework for the dialogue, both dramatically and
conceptually: it is because of a particular concern
with the proper practice of erōs that philia comes up
in the first place as a topic for discussion, and as the
dialogue proceeds, we find that the peculiar kind of
eroticism advocated and practiced by Socrates
requires a transformation of the conventional ways
of understanding and practicing both erōs and
philia. I demonstrate that the dialogue’s discussions
about philia cannot adequately be understood without a careful examination of the role of erōs in bringing about and shaping those discussions: if erōs
plays a role in the dialogue as a whole, it is necessary
for us to understand that role if we are to rightly
understand the discussions about philia that take
place within this erotic context. The result of this
approach is a scholarly contribution that makes good
sense of passages in the text that others have found
perplexing or irrelevant. In that work of interpretation, I have not explicitly brought in “Christian
scholarly principles,” but my formation and identity
as a Christian have certainly been relevant to my
work as a scholar.

ENDNOTES
1. This assumed moral individualism is at the root of the
currently popular description of a mutually beneficial
agreement as constituting a “win/win situation”: it is
presupposed that there are two “sides” involved, and that
only by dint of such an agreement is conflict (in which
by necessity one wins and the other loses) averted.
2. Platonic Studies (Princeton University Press, 1973),
3-6 (here 6). Vlastos sets up his standard with reference to Aristotle, not Plato. It should be noted that
Vlastos recognizes that even Aristotle’s own accounts
do not completely “live up” to the idealized standard
of philia for which Vlastos appeals to Aristotle in the
first place: “That Aristotle’s notion of ‘perfect’ love
should be so limited is disappointing. But this does not
spoil it for my purposes in this essay. All I need here

is to find a standard against which to measure Plato’s
concept of love. . . . This standard Aristotle does
supply. That to love a person we must wish for that
person’s good for the person’s sake, not for ours—so
much Aristotle understands. Does Plato?” (6). (For
warnings about the inappropriateness of making
Aristotle’s accounts of philia into a standard of “Greek
friendship” against which to judge Plato, see David
Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World
[Cambridge University Press, 1997], 67-68, and
Diskin Clay, “Platonic Studies and the Study of Plato,”
Arion 2 [1975]: 116-132 [here 120-21]).
3. Platonic Studies 31.
4. Platonic Studies 30-34. David Konstan, in differentiating the dynamics of classical friendship from those
of modern friendship, argues that this standard of love
as devotion to the other’s uniqueness rather than to his
or her admirable qualities is of one piece with modern,
individualistic assumptions: “Modern discussions
often suppose that the basis of attraction between
friends lies in their individual or personal qualities. . . .
In a world in which a subject conceives of itself as
different in essence from other humans, a monad constituted by unique attributes, intimacy has a special
significance. Only by a mysterious contact across the
boundaries of self can one escape existential loneliness. . . . Communication with other beings is
presumed to be a difficult matter. Hence the need for
relationships--a term often employed in place of
friendship in modern discussions” (Friendship in the
Classical World 15, 17).
5. Although I have focused my remarks in this section on
Vlastos’ individualistic assumptions and their consequences for his interpretation of the relationship
between erōs and philia and of Plato’s treatment
of “love” in general, similar assumptions and consequences can also be discerned in other separatist
interpreters. See Gerasimos Santas (see note 9), 39,
51, 57, 62-63; and Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), 166-67, 181-84.
6. These quotations include: what it is about a person
that makes him or her philos (“friend” or “dear”) to
another, how one becomes a philos of another, who is
the philos, what sort of people can be philoi to one
another, the purpose for which one is philos to another,
and the character of the prōton philon (“primary dear
thing” or “first friend”). David Konstan has urged

against describing the topic of the Lysis as philia,
pointing out precisely this variety of questions: they
do not simply take the form “What is philia ?” but
rather are focused on “the reasons why (dia ti, heneka
tou) a person likes someone or something” (Friendship
in the Classical World 73). In addition, Konstan
argues that, in the classical Greek literature generally,
the term philos is restricted to a particular sort of
friendship (9). While duly noting Konstan’s warning
to pay careful attention to Plato’s exact form of expression (advice that is especially important if one is, as
Konstan, engaging in a survey project that compares
the varying uses of certain terms by different authors
writing at different times and places), I will nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion (which focuses
entirely on a single work by a single author), gather the
matter of these various particular questions by the
general term philia. This term is warranted by the text
of the Lysis itself: at several points, Socrates uses the
term philia to describe the subject of their discussions,
that of which they are seeking to discover the cause
(207c11, 214d7, 215d4, 216b5, 217e9, 219a4, 220b3,
221d3, 221e4, 222d2).
7. Unless otherwise indicated, translation of passages
from the Lysis are those of David Bolotin, Plato’s
Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis,
with a New Translation (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1979). For references to the Greek
text I use John Burnet’s edition in volume III of the
Oxford Classical Text (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1903). The reader is reminded that within this discussion, references to “Socrates” or “Socratic” principles
refer only to that Socrates who is a character in (and
sometimes, as in the Lysis, also the narrator of) Plato’s
dialogues. Thus when I speak, for example, of a
“particularly Socratic eroticism,” I mean the particular
understanding and expression of erōs advocated and
practiced by Plato’s Socrates in distinction from his
interlocutors’ assumptions about erōs .
8. Thus, for instance, Diogenes Lertius, listing Plato’s
dialogues according to Thrasylus’ classification, refers
to this dialogue by the double title Lysis and peri
philias (III.59). In our own time, David Bolotin has
given his translation of and commentary on the Lysis
the title Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship (see note 7
above).
9. For the assertion that the Symposium and Phaedrus,
and not the Lysis, are focused on erōs, see, for example,
G.R.F. Ferrari, “Platonic Love,” in The Cambridge
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Companion to Plato (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 248-276; for the
assumption that Plato distinguishes between erōs and
philia on the same lines as were conventional in his
society, see, for example, Gerasimos Santas, “Plato on
Love, Beauty and the Good” in The Greeks and the
Good Life, ed. David J. Depew (Fullerton and
Indianapolis: California State University, Fullerton
and Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 33-68, and
Charles Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The
Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 258.
10. A number of scholars have explicitly stated that the
opening encounter is to be excluded from serious consideration of the dialogue’s concern with philia. Thus
Hans von Arnim, for example, asserts that the erotically
focused “introduction” of the dialogue is “merely dramatic setting,” so that erotic concerns have nothing to
do with the “inquiry proper” of the dialogue (quoted in
Paul Friedländer, Plato: The Dialogues, First Period
[New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1964], 314-15).
11. According to von Arnim, the reference to erōs at
222a-b is “the only place in the Lysis where (apart
from the introduction, which is merely dramatic setting)
reference is made to the love of boys. It is outside the
inquiry proper and is merely a casual jest” (quoted in
Paul Friedländer, op. cit., 314). In the estimation of
Charles Kahn, on the other hand, Socrates in the
course of the discussion actually abandons philia for a
focus on erōs, even if he continues to use the language
of philia, so that the later references to erōs simply
reveal what is really at stake in the discussion (Plato
and the Socratic Dialogue 259, 261, 265).
12. There are some interpreters who have called attention to the operation of erōs in the dialogue, but the
force of their explanations has largely been blunted by
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their tendency to blur the distinctions between erōs and
philia, at least in Plato’s use of these terms. For these
scholars, erōs becomes basically indistinguishable
from (or even identified with) philia in Plato’s writings.
Thus Paul Friedländer, while taking Hans von Arnim
to task for relegating erōs to a mere frame of the
dialogue, himself diminishes the significance of erōs
for the dialogue’s treatment of philia by failing to
consider erōs and philia as distinct but related experiences (Plato: An Introduction [New York and
Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1958], 32-58). Charles
Kahn, on the other hand, begins with a clearly stated
distinction (in fact a division) between erōs and philia,
appealing to the general cultural presuppositions
evident in the Athenian literature of Plato’s day.
Having made this sharp distinction, however, Kahn
also proceeds to elide it through the way in which he
approaches Plato’s text: in his estimation, those parts
of the discussion that attribute to philia characteristics
that Kahn thinks are specifically erotic are proclaimed
to be “really” about erōs, even if they are expressed in
the language of philia (see previous note). Thus these
authors, too, even while they discuss the role of erōs in
the Lysis, fail to consider the intertwining (neither
absolute separation nor simple identification) of erōs
and philia within the words and actions of the dialogue. Therefore the statement of Francisco J. Gonzalez
(“Plato’s Lysis: An Enactment of Philosophical
Kinship,” Ancient Philosophy 15 [1995]: 69-90) that
“some [scholars] see philia, and others erōs, as the dialogue’s subject matter” (69) is somewhat misleading;
it is more accurate to say that some scholars consider
the Lysis to be about philia to the exclusion of erōs,
whereas others insist that, for Plato, philia is inseparable from erōs or even identified with it.

